Docker-based self-hosted WordPress deployment system with: - Four-container stack (nginx, wordpress/php-fpm, mariadb, certbot) - Automatic SSL via Let's Encrypt with self-signed fallback - First-boot WordPress setup via WP-CLI (GeneratePress + child theme, plugins) - Interactive setup wizard and one-line install script - Backup, update, healthcheck, and SSL renewal scripts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
64 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Practices
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## Container Security
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- All containers use minimal Alpine-based images where possible
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- MariaDB is not exposed to the host network — it communicates only with WordPress on the internal Docker network
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- Only ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS) are exposed to the host
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- No containers run in privileged mode
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- The Docker socket is never mounted into any container
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- All containers use `restart: unless-stopped` (not `always`)
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## SSL/TLS
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- Let's Encrypt certificates are acquired automatically on first boot
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- Certificates are renewed automatically every 12 hours (per Let's Encrypt recommendation)
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- TLS 1.2+ only (TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are disabled)
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- Strong cipher suites with forward secrecy
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- HSTS header with a 2-year max-age
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- OCSP stapling enabled
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- SSL session tickets disabled for forward secrecy
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## WordPress Hardening
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- **`DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT`**: The theme and plugin file editor in wp-admin is disabled. This prevents an attacker with admin access from injecting code via the editor. Note: this does NOT block plugin/theme updates via the admin GUI — those still work normally.
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- **XML-RPC disabled**: The XML-RPC endpoint is disabled both at the application level (via mu-plugin) and at the nginx level (returns 403). XML-RPC is a common attack vector for brute-force and DDoS amplification.
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- **Non-standard table prefix**: Tables use `wbox_` instead of the default `wp_`, which mitigates automated SQL injection attacks targeting default table names.
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- **Strong passwords**: Database passwords and WordPress salts are auto-generated using cryptographic randomness (`openssl rand`). Admin passwords must be at least 12 characters.
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- **Post revisions limited**: WordPress stores a maximum of 10 revisions per post to limit database growth.
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- **Minor auto-updates**: WordPress core security patches are applied automatically.
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## Nginx Security
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- **Rate limiting**: `wp-login.php` is rate-limited to 1 request/second with a burst of 3, mitigating brute-force login attempts.
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- **Security headers**: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options (SAMEORIGIN), X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy.
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- **PHP upload restrictions**: Blocked in `uploads/` directory at nginx level.
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- **Hidden files blocked**: Dotfiles (`.htaccess`, `.git`, etc.) return 403.
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## Wordfence
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Wordfence is pre-installed and provides:
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- Application-level web application firewall (WAF)
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- Brute-force login protection
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- Malware scanning
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- Real-time threat intelligence
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Note: Wordfence's `.htaccess`-based WAF rules do not apply to nginx. The nginx rate limiting and Wordfence's application-level firewall provide equivalent protection.
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## Secrets Management
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- All secrets are stored in `.env` with permissions set to `600` (owner read/write only)
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- The `.env` file is gitignored and never committed to the repository
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- Auto-generated admin passwords are stored temporarily in `.credentials` — users are instructed to delete this file after recording the password
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- WordPress salts are generated uniquely per installation
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## Network Architecture
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```
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Internet → :80/:443 → nginx → wordpress (FastCGI :9000) → db (:3306 internal only)
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↕
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certbot (ACME challenges)
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```
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Only nginx is reachable from the internet. All other services communicate on the internal Docker network (`websitebox_internal`).
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